ABSTRACT
Management in the 1980's at the US Environmental Protection Agency was concerned that large quantities of data were collected at great expense, but these data were of little value to determine compliance or to regulate. The data answered questions that were not essential to decision-making or were of such uncertain quality that the data could not support a decision. To assure that the right data were collected to make correct decisions, a decision logic was developed and used at EPA and the US Department of Energy that demanded stakeholder agreement on the problem and creation of a quantitative "decision rule". This decision rule focused on defining the precise problem and balancing risk associated with proposed action and acceptable uncertainty in the supporting data. Since required environmental data are expensive or difficult to obtain, tools to quantify resulting data uncertainty and need for more data to make correct decisions were developed through advances in Kriging and Bayesian statistical inference. But, important decisions are really driven by the tradeoff between cost of obtaining more data to reduce uncertainty and cost of action. Efforts to generate quantitatively-based, informed cost driven decisions relied on Raifa's foundational work on statistical decision theory.
Complex mathematical formulae were derived from Raifa's theory to determine when to stop collecting data and take action or when to just take action. This paper summarizes 20 years of research, methodology development, and applications by Professor Daniel Goodman to address environmental decision-making.
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US EPA PROBLEM
In the 1980s, the US EPA was spending about $200 million of its $1 billion annual budget collecting data on concentrations of pollutants in the environment. Management expected to use these data to make intelligent decisions on what to clean up and what to regulate ---to protect the public health and ecological systems from harm. US EPA required industries and state and local governments it was regulating to collect pollutant data to document compliance with established pollutant standards associated with drinking water; air quality; surface, estuary, ground and ocean waters; solid waste disposal; pesticide and toxic chemical use and environmental levels; and radioactive chemicals. At the time, US EPA estimated that the regulated entities were spending about 10 to 15 times more than US EPA on environmental data collection ---perhaps $2 to 3 billion annually.
Huge sums of money were spent, but were the resulting data measurably contributing to making informed and prudent decisions? Or, were the data so uncertain that decisions were made "in spite of the data"? The Data Quality Management office at US EPA began to ask ---what type and quality of data should be collected to make informed regulatory decisions?
Few managers were willing to take the time to ask: "What is the problem that requires attention and are data needed to address the problem? If data are needed, what specific data are needed and how will that data be used to address the problem or make a difference?"
To answer these key basic questions, Data Quality Management and Dan Goodman began a 20 year relationship. Dan encouraged us to use decision analysis, cost-benefit analysis, and risk assessment. US EPA could no longer afford to collect expensive data, and still make wrong decisions (e.g., either regulating when regulation was not required or not regulating when the public or ecological health were harmed).
THEORY
In most environmental regulatory decisions, we found that large quantities of data were collected at great expense, but were of little value to determine compliance or to regulate. The data answered questions that were not essential to decision-making or were of such uncertain quality that the data could not support a decision.
Problem Definition
What was thought to be a simple concept, define the problem and collect the data turned out to be far more complex. Careful problem definition is critical. With every stakeholder comes their view of the problem requiring attention. Identifying the stakeholders is the starting point.
Getting them to precisely articulate their view of the problem is challenging, because most stakeholders view things in generic, not precise terms. A non-precise problem has multiple courses of action.
The first step is to get the stakeholders (those who can influence the action and outcome) together to agree on the problem that should be addressed. The problem has to be precise --- We found that every issue we faced started with one fundamental, precisely stated problem.
From there, one always found that there was a sequence of associated problems and precise answers. There was no environmental problem we observed where there were parallel problems, requiring parallel efforts to resolve. There was always a fundamental issue that directly affected all other issues. These other issues were always dependent on an answer to the upstream fundamental issue. Many times we thought the stakeholders had defined the fundamental problem of concern, only to determine that a more basic issue preceded the stated problem. For example, the logical stakeholder issue/action/question was remediate the contamination in the ground water before it spreads to the drinking water aquifer. But, the key question really was cost of remediation. If remediation was $10,000, then spend the money and be done. If the remediation cost $100 million or the cost is too uncertain to define, one prefers to understand the cost-benefit of remediation and value of additional data to make a correct decision on whether to remediate and extent of remediation. Because of the human factor, the precise capture of the key issues in the problem definition and operationalization of regulatory concerns is often the most difficult part of optimizing a real cleanup. It can also be the most important part, since it sets the stage for all the details that follow. No amount of math and statistics will salvage a project plan for a mis-stated problem; with a mis-stated problem all that the math and statistics will provide is an elegant answer to the wrong question. By contrast, successful problem definition states the problem in such a way that all the remaining decisions for optimization are merely technical, which is a relief since there is a large portfolio of proven, relatively mechanical formulations … that can be applied for technical optimization.
(1, at p.4346) An example: A million gallon underground storage tank at Hanford, Washington containing 500, 000 gallons of a water slurry of high level radioactive waste. Samples taken in the soil column immediately adjacent to the tank show radioactively consistent with the inventory of waste in the tank. Numerous stakeholders want to pursue various solutions (e.g., pump the tanks and temporarily store pumped contents in preparation for vitrification; locate all contamination and its magnitude; monitor the progression of existing soil column plume to the ground water table). (1, at p. 4329)
Remaining Important Steps
From precise problem definition, one next needs to determine the possible actions that would address/solve the problem. The examples above show the linkage between problem and action. Asking next, how would data influence the decision on what action to take? How good do the data need to be to make the correct decisions? How costly would collecting the required data be and could the required data be collected at any cost? Finally, one should understand the balance between cost of collecting the right data and "brute force" resolving the problem or changing one's operation to eliminate the problem.
Data Quality Objective Process
This logic was transformed into the seven step, "Data Quality Objective" (DQO) process. This logic was formalized in directives issued by key EPA regulatory offices and the Quality Management Office, who required that all data collection performed by Regional Offices must follow this framework. Dan and his team pursued a computer-based tool so stakeholders and data collectors could follow a disciplined logic. Since most stakeholders and data collectors were not equipped to arrive at error tolerances or to optimize the design, the intent was to automate these steps using statistical tools Dan was developing. The software became a documentation tool for the sophisticated facilitators who worked with the stakeholders and data collectors on answering the seven steps. The process used by the facilitator to help the stakeholders sort through all the "policy calls" was key. In every environmental issue, there are policy calls (e.g., cleaning up to human habitability or to an industrial application standard; how clean is clean; what level of acceptable risk ---zero risk so no measurable contamination, or acceptable to a risk of 1 in 1000 of having an adverse event affecting a normally healthy individual).
In some cases, the policy call is very simple ---clean up the contamination because the cost of cleanup is minimal. If the cost of cleanup is prohibitive for typical unrestricted usage, then establish restricted usage and boundaries for restricted use (e.g., industrial lands where contaminants are bound to soil column, so concern for leaching is de minimus, add clean soil layer and use only for industrial applications and workers are on site less than 30% of any 7 day week. Or, when the cost of cleanup could be substantial (e.g., potential for large number of random hot spots so substantial costly remediation might be required), qualitatively balance the cost of sampling and analysis required to pinpoint actual contaminant levels with the level of acceptable exposure risk, established by desired future use. The more tolerant the exposure risk (e.g., higher tolerance for uncertainty), the less sampling and analysis one has to perform because one can tolerate missed hot spots. Increased tolerance for missed hot spots translates to usage compatible with less allowable exposure (e.g., limited land use).
Once the policy calls are made, translating those calls into a set of concrete criteria for action results in creating the decision rule for stakeholder endorsement and data collector implementation. An example decision rule is:
If the concentration of dioxin in the first 5 inches of soil depth, averaged over any 5000 square foot section of the site under consideration for remediation is greater than 1 ppm, with a false negative error tolerance of 5 %, then remove the top 8 inches of soil and incinerate that soil to 5 nines. This decision rule and associated policy calls permit localized hot spots potentially significantly above 10 ppm to remain unremediated, because the continued land use will be pasture land. This is a decision rule that accepts some risk from dioxin exposure, balancing the cost of sampling and analysis and the cost of incineration.
This decision rule also defines the tolerance for uncertainty in the measured levels of dioxin. From this decision rule, one can define an optimized sampling program to locate clean and dirty areas, initially based on where the dust suppressant containing the dioxin was sprayed and where dioxin bound to surface soil eroded during rain events. This decision rule took three months to negotiate starting with initial stakeholder policy calls and ending with a precise rule that established "how clean is clean". This decision rule was a careful balance between the cost and benefit of sampling to obtain more precise data on contaminant distribution with cost of soil removal and dioxin destruction, given the future use of the land after cleanup. 
Replacing Hypothesis Testing Based Design with Statistical Decision Theory Logic
Stakeholders recognized the value of defining the precise problem and associated actions before embarking on expensive remediations. Everyone intuitively understood that the costs of sampling and analysis to obtain more precise data were tolerated up to a point. But, many recognized the real driver for cleanup was the bankroll set aside for cleanup. There was no quantitative methodology balancing the cost and tradeoff of how much sampling to perform with the cost and tradeoff of how much cleanup was necessary and the cost/risk of making wrong decisions about cleaning up. For addressing uncertainty, the DQO process employed hypothesis testing. This methodology focused on uncertainty in existing data compared to making decisions based on a comprehensive data set. Hypothesis testing estimated the additional data required to achieve desired false negative and false positive error rates, established, somehow, by the stakeholders.
In applying hypothesis testing, four specifications are required and problematic to define. They are: a) the critical significance level, b) the power requirement that determines the false negative and false positive error tolerances, c) the width of the "gray area" that defines the alternative hypothesis, and d) the expected standard deviation used in the power test. Dan showed that these four specifications really matter. Changes in these key parameters addressing acceptable uncertainty in the DQO process can greatly change the cost of a remediation and the cost of a characterization program. Getting these specifications right determine whether human health and ecological risk at the site is controlled to as low a level as required, while simultaneously minimizing cost.
But, cost of remediation was not a factor in establishing these values. Further, establishing values for these four specifications relied on expert judgment which introduced subjectivity in the DQO process. What really was the rationale for establishing a 5% false negative error rate or a gray zone that was within 15% of the acceptable threshold?
Since the late 1980s, Dan remained concerned that even though the DQO process was a major step forward, it lacked an objective methodology for understanding and balancing cost of remediation with cost of collecting more data to make the right remediation decision. In the early 1990s, Dan began addressing these weaknesses. He turned to H. Raiffa's work in the 1950's on statistical decision theory. Dan wanted to incorporate cost, benefit, risk into calculations to determine the value of collecting more data (balancing cost of obtaining better information with the cost of taking right and wrong actions). In his key paper in 1996, Dan posed the issue:
The costs of data collection can be very high; but, the data can be more than worth their cost if the additional data result in a better remediation by eliminating wasteful unnecessary remediation or by avoiding costly corrective action that might be necessary if an initial remediation were inadequate. The key to the success of the decision theory approach lies in balancing the costs of data against the cost reductions that data can confer. In calculating the required certainty for making a remediation decision, statistical decision theory considers the costs and probabilities of all the possible outcomes of the remediation decision (including the possible mistakes). In calculating the merits of more sampling, statistical decision theory considers the cost of the data, the probability that the new data will lead to a better decision, and the cost saving that would be attributable to a better decision. How wide a margin of safety should be allowed in deciding about remediation of a unit where the samples are near the action level? How many additional samples should be taken to increase the certainty? The correct answers to these questions depend on the cost of remediation, the costs of mistaken decisions (e.g., the cost of an unscheduled cleanup if later monitoring reveals that an area that was not initially scheduled for planned remediation really is above the action level) and the costs of samples.
Statistical decision theory finds the correct margin of safety and the correct investment in sampling to minimize the total cost. 
APPLICATIONS
Over this twenty year relationship, Dan and team worked on a number of projects for the US EPA across the US and for US Department of Energy at Hanford, Los Alamos, and Oak Ridge.
Some of these applied the DQO Process relying on hypothesis testing and Kriging and some employed Bayesian techniques to estimate pollutant concentrations.
Kriging
This tool developed in the mining industry to estimate the potential locations of minable deposits based on point sample data, was substantially enhanced by Dan and team. Kriging offered statistical justification for the way it generates a smoothed, interpolated map of concentrations.
Kriging also generates explicit uncertainty measures for the interpolated and smoothed estimates. These uncertainty measures can guide the extent of cleanup or can be used to make decisions on optimizing selection of sampling locations to provide key new data. But, Kriging has limitations (e.g., choices of variogram model and Kriging neighborhood), which Dan corrected by incorporating "bootstrapping and jackknife" methods. By developing a new computational tool, these latter methods became practical for improving variogram estimation. (4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15) 
Piazza Road
An oil containing dioxin which leached into the adjacent pasture/farm land, was applied to roads as a dust suppressant. The cost of incinerating contaminated dirt is large. So, burning "clean" dirt is not desired. Could one pinpoint the dioxin contamination in the land adjacent to the road, so only those locations of contaminated soil above a certain threshold would be removed for incineration? What was the balance between collecting large numbers of soil samples for dioxin analysis and pinpointing only those locations where sample collection would supply specific data on where soil required removal. The DQO Process and sophisticated Kriging techniques were applied. (5, 6) These papers discuss issues related to:
1) separation between policy calls about risk goals and technical discussion of costeffective alternatives for implementation,
2) translation of the regulatory policy calls (including definition of tolerances for uncertainty) into specific, concrete, measurable cleanup criteria, 3) documentation of agreements reached among stakeholders on the critical requirements for the cleanup, and 4) use of optimization methods to develop and deploy the most cost-efficient design for obtaining more sample data, balanced with cost of removing and incinerating the necessary contaminated soil to achieve stakeholder decision rule requirements. Figure 1 shows where soil contaminated with dioxin needed to be removed. Based on the stakeholder-established decision rule, substantially less soil required removal and incineration.
Carolina Transformer
This 5 acre site in North Carolina was used to repair and store electric transformers. PCBs were found in the soil at various depths. The DQO process, Kriging techniques, and the resulting focused sampling program identified the likely locations of elevated pollutant concentrations and the degree of remediation required. The logic, used in Piazza Road, was employed here. Stakeholders constructed a "discomfort" curve that defined boundaries of tolerable false positive and false negative error in concentrations of PCB as a function of soil depth. Given the decision rule and associated error tolerances, the site was divided into 61 "remediation units" and a sampling strategy was used to estimate PCB concentrations at depth.
The resulting data showed that most of the units had PCB contamination above the decision rule threshold, but only half the units had PCB levels greater than 10 ppm in the soil layer greater than 10 inches deep. Based on the stakeholder decision rule, a remediation strategy was developed that removed only 8 inches of soil in 1/3 of the area (would have removed only 2 inches but the backhoe tool could not easily remove less than 8 inches of soil). Another 1/3 of the site had 10 inches of soil removed. But, only ¼ of the site had 16 inches of soil removed. (16, at appendix 3)
Collierville
At this Tennessee site, Trichloroethylene (TCE) leaked into the city drinking water aquifer.
Extraction wells treated the contaminated aquifer. The issue was where to locate testing wells to predict TCE concentrations to determine containment success and need for additional extraction wells. The DQO Process was used to create containment and action decision rules (e.g., If, at any point outside present 4 ppb isocon, concentration predicted 90 days in advance, from regression on past 3 quarterly samples at monitoring wells, is below 30 ppb, then containment is succeeding). new strategically placed test wells ), the decision rule was met and the city saved the expense of three additional extraction wells.
Oak Ridge Bethel Valley Stronium Contamination
Dan used these enhanced Kriging tools to estimate strontium (Sr) concentrations in the soil and water table under the extensive facilities at the US DOE in Bethel Valley, Tennessee. Based on a localized large data base, Dan and team created three dimensional maps of Sr contamination as a function of depth. Average depth to bedrock in this area was 10 feet and average depth to water table was 20 feet. The information was transformed into a "movie" that showed risk, (i.e., the expected concentrations of Sr and associated uncertainty for narrow vertical slices based on existing data and Kriging). Figure 2 shows existing Sr contamination in the soil. Figure 3 shows where Sr soil contamination concentrations are "known" (green) and where Sr soil contamination concentrations are uncertain (red). From these graphics, one could visually locate those areas where more data would reduce uncertainty, where remediation was a priority, and where access should be limited.
(17)
Hanford
The primary focus was on the 177 large single and double shell underground storage tanks (most were 50 feet in diameter and 20-30 feet high) containing radioactive waste products from plutonium production. These tanks were located in a number of tank farms which contained from 12 to 20 tanks. Waste was moved from tank to tank, so records of the waste contents, composition, and concentrations were of limited value. Sampling the contents of these highly radioactive waste tanks with very few port entries are difficult and costly. There is substantial vertical and horizontal heterogeneity in the tank contents. The tank contents data were too limited and contradictory, so trying to apply Dan's sophisticated Kriging methodology produced little valuable data.
Since a large number of these tanks were leaking their slurry contents into the soil column around the tanks, Dan used his Kriging tool box and 3 dimensional graphical movie displays to estimate contaminant concentrations in the vadose zone around the leaking tanks. Some
questions were: what data did we have, how good were that data, and where specifically should we take additional very expensive samples to increase the quality of information on contaminant concentration and migration toward the water table, and potential entry into the Columbia River? Figure 4 shows expected locations of Sr in the vadose zone based on existing data and Kriging.
SAMPLAN
The DQO Process establishes a structure for stakeholders to reach consensus on the problem confronting them and the desired action(s) to address the problem. Stakeholders wrestle with uncertainty and agree on the type and extent of information needed to make a correct decision.
Dan's enhanced Kriging tool box provided the quantitative methodology to take available data and estimate concentrations at distances from measured values and the uncertainty in those estimated concentrations. Kriging outcomes permitted decisions on where additional sampling would materially improve uncertainty, so better decisions would be made. Statistical decision theory and Bayesian statistical inference added cost-benefit-risk assessment to determine the tradeoff between action and collecting more data. SAMPLAN is a computer assisted tool that balances the cost of action with the cost of collecting more information. Figure 5 shows the relation between the expected cost of deciding positive or negative and the probability of actual positive. If the probability of an actual positive is less than the value of where the cost lines intersect, then it is more cost effective NOT to take action (e.g., don't remediate). Figure 6 shows how to estimate the cost of uncertainty. In the 1996 period, Dan prepared a number of documents describing the theory, mathematics, and applications for this methodology.
(1, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20) These papers present examples of how various costs and sample results affect decisions on whether to take action, based on the available data, the cross over probability, optimized number of new samples, and total expected costs of an action. intuitive to environmental program leaders. In the future, the hope is that Dan's tool box will find a home in the regulated community, the real beneficiaries of these applications. 
